Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'In Praed.', 'Mereology' and 'Idealism: a critical survey'

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14 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / a. Axioms for sets
Maybe set theory need not be well-founded [Varzi]
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 1. Mereology
Mereology need not be nominalist, though it is often taken to be so [Varzi]
Are there mereological atoms, and are all objects made of them? [Varzi]
There is something of which everything is part, but no null-thing which is part of everything [Varzi]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / a. Substance
Substance is an intrinsic thing, so parts of substances can't also be intrinsic things [Duns Scotus]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 5. Composition of an Object
'Composition is identity' says multitudes are the reality, loosely composing single things [Varzi]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / a. Parts of objects
The parthood relation will help to define at least seven basic predicates [Varzi]
If 'part' is reflexive, then identity is a limit case of parthood [Varzi]
'Part' stands for a reflexive, antisymmetric and transitive relation [Varzi]
Parts may or may not be attached, demarcated, arbitrary, material, extended, spatial or temporal [Varzi]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts
Sameness of parts won't guarantee identity if their arrangement matters [Varzi]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / b. Conceivable but impossible
Conceivability may indicate possibility, but literary fantasy does not [Varzi]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / b. Pro-coherentism
We can no more expect a precise definition of coherence than we can of the moral ideal [Ewing]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / c. Coherentism critique
If undetailed, 'coherence' is just a vague words that covers all possible arguments [Ewing]